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Abstract 
The global financial crisis reinvigorated ongoing debates over whether China has its 
own distinct and separate “model” of political economy and/or development. There is 
much that connects this Chinese model with previous systems of national political 
economies; partly in terms of specific policy preferences, but also in terms of shared 
basic conceptions of the distribution of power in the global order. Like these previous 
systems, China has come to stand as an example of an alternative to following 
dominant (neo)liberal models of development. In this respect, what the China model 
is not and what China does not stand for might be more important than what it 
actually is and what it stands for. However, the idea of a coherent and unique Chinese 
model has considerable purchase, and is both informed and feeds into considerations 
of China’s uniqueness and difference from the norms, ideas and philosophies that 
dominate in the rest of the world. 
 
 Flexibility, pragmatism and experimentation  
 representing a clear and coherent model in itself, the Chinese experience is   
 
 
Introduction 
Over three hundred years since Adam Smith developed the “scientific” study of 
political economy with the publication of what became known as “The Wealth of 
Nations”1, debates over the relationship between states and markets that inspired 
Smith remain at the heart of the study of International Political Economy (IPE). 
Moreover, in the wake of the economic crises that began to shake the world in 2008, 
the relationship has once more become central in policy debates; over the most 
effective forms of economic governance within individual economies/states, over 
forms of transnational governance and regulation, and over the very nature of the 
global order itself. In the process, interest has grown in the possibility of an emerging 
Chinese alternative to what had become dominant (neo)liberal modes of development 
and governance – a “Beijing Consensus” or a “China model” – and whether this might 
“undo much of the progress that has been made on democracy and governance” in the 
developing world.
2
 
 
This paper first traces the emergence of China Model discourses, and then outlines the 
dominant reoccurring trends in these discussions. It argues that that the idea of a 
                                                 
1
  More formally, Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
(London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776). 
2
 In the words of the July 2005 US House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Human 
Rights and International Operations hearing on China’s Influence in Africa. Available at available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa22658.000/hfa22658_0f.htm accessed 13 August 
2009. 
distinct and unique China Model is in some ways misleading. If the China Model is 
thought of as being abnormal and deviating from the dominant norm of (neo)liberal 
development (as it is in some areas), then this simply ignores the normality of strong 
state developmentalism over history. By essentially extended Chang’s analysis in 
“Kicking away the Ladder”,3 the aim here is to locate the contemporary Chinese 
developmental/governance experience in a longer term historical perspective. By 
doing so, the Chinese “Model”, whilst clearly having unique and country specific 
features, can be seen as a variant of a relatively well trodden statist development path, 
and not as peculiar or atypical as appears at first sight. Indeed, it seems to be 
influenced, albeit indirectly, by one of the main critiques of Smith’s ideas in the shape 
of Friedrich List’s “The National System of Political Economy”.4 Moreover, if we 
focus on what really is distinctly Chinese about this model, then it is doubtful whether 
other developing states have the same conditions, factor endowments and social and 
historical backgrounds to be able to emulate what China has done.
5
  
 
But despite all this, China nevertheless provides an important example of an 
alternative to the neoliberal project that had come to dominate developmental 
discourses in the first part of the millennium – particularly as state-led alternatives 
seemed to have been somewhat undermined by the Asian crisis of 1997. So perhaps 
what China offers is not so much a “model”, but an example to others of what can be 
done, and an example of other ways for doing things (as well as an alternative 
economic partner). Or perhaps China acts as a metaphor for “difference” – a different 
                                                 
3
 Ha-Joon Chang , Kicking Away the Ladder – Development Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(London: Anthem, 2005). 
4
 A four volume work first published in 1841. In preparing this paper I have used the open access 
online version available via the McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought 
available at http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/list/index.html 
5
 Barry Naughton, ‘China’s Distinctive System: Can it Be a Model for Others?’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, 19: 65, 2010, pp.437-460.  
way of developing from what had become the mainstream agenda, and a different 
understanding of the way that the global order should be constructed and international 
relations should be conducted. In this respect, what the China model is – what it 
actually entails – is less important than what it is not.  
 
This “negative” definition is also important in creating a form of Occidentalism, 
whereby an image of what the West is and stands for is constructed to emphasise how 
China is “different”. This is used to help explain why China will behave differently 
from previous great powers, particularly in its dealings with (other) developing states. 
It is feeds into, and is itself fed by, an emerging sense of “Chinese exceptionalism” – 
an idea that China is fundamentally different from other countries with some sort of 
global duty and responsibility to promote an alternative to the dominant global order.  
 
For some Chinese scholars, this emerging discourse and the idea of a China Model are 
not only mutually reinforcing, but also together help reinforce the status quo in China. 
Crucially, this “project” is seen as being helped by those foreign scholars who have 
championed the China Model. Thus, in terms of both Chinese power in the global 
system and also the existing distribution of power within China, then the “China 
Model” can be thought of as a speech act – talking of it, and defining it in a specific 
way, makes it real and gives it real power. 
 
 
The Emergence of the China Model Discourse 
As we shall see, there has been considerable interest within China on the nature of any 
China Model (or if it exists at all). But in many respects, the idea of a Chinese 
alternative to the West has been driven by foreign observers of China’s global 
influence. Often intertwined with early sightings of Chinese “soft power” this 
included those who saw the emergence of Chinese ideas and practices that might 
reconfigure power relationships to undermine the position of the US in East Asia
6
 and 
Africa
7
, and ultimately to challenge both the political (liberal democracy) and 
economic (neoliberalism) bases of the global order.
8
 In short, the (neo)liberal model 
of development was under threat and Fukuyama’s claim that ‘liberal democracy 
remains the only coherent political aspiration’9 seemed challenged by the emergence 
of China’s politically illiberal strong state capitalism, and the desire of some to 
emulate it. 
 
But it was a very different foreign identification of a Chinese alternative in that really 
set the agenda. First aired in an op ed in the Financial Times in May 2004,
10
 and in a 
widely circulated pamphlet produced by the Foreign Policy Centre in London,
11
 
Joshua Ramo’s identification of a “Beijing Consensus” seemed to catch a popular 
mood. This was not an entirely laudatory assessment with Ramo noting the “existing 
contradictions of reform” and the urgent need to move to a new development mode.12 
Indeed, much of what Ramo identified as being attractive to others were policies that 
were being promoted by the then leadership as means of overcoming these 
contradictions. So when Ramo spoke of the Beijing Consensus as characterised by 
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 Susan Windybank, ‘The China Syndrome’, Policy, 21, 2005, p.28. 
7
 Drew Thompson, ‘Economic Growth and Soft Power: China's Africa Strategy’, Jamestown 
Foundation China Brief, 4: 24, 2004. 
8
 Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner, ‘China’s Illiberal Challenge: The Real Threat Posed by China isn’t 
Economic or Military—it’s Ideological’, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Fall, 2006, pp.56-68. 
9
 Francis Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), p.xiii. 
10
 Joshua Cooper Ramo, ‘China Has Discovered Its Own Economic Consensus’, Financial Times, 8 
May 2004. 
11
 Joshua Ramo, The Beijing Consensus Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power (London: Foreign 
Policy Centre, 2004). Not to be confused with a book with the same name published six years later that 
sees the Chinese “model” in a much less positive light – see Stefan Halper (2010) The Beijing 
Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century (New York: 
Basic Books). 
12
 Ramo, “China Has Discovered Its Own Economic Consensus”. 
innovation and a commitment to equitable growth, this should be taken more as a sign 
of what the leadership wanted the development strategy to become in the future rather 
than an outline of what it had already was. Indeed, in a number of respects, it remains 
more of an aspiration than a reality even today.  
 
Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging that the Beijing Consensus was not problem free,  
Ramo’s assessment contained strong elements of admiration, and did much to spark 
debates over the nature of this Chinese alternative. This included generating 
discussion within China itself about the nature of the “Beijing Gongshi 北京共识” and 
its difference from the dominant Washington Consensus.
13
 I'm more recent years, the 
focus on gongshi has tended to be overshadowed by the rise of new terms to describe 
what Qian Gang calls a “discourse of greatness” (shengshi huayu 盛世话语).14 Of 
these, the idea of a “China Model” (zhongguo moshi 中国模式) has emerged as the 
most often used term.
15
 Qian Gang’s analysis also shows how interest in the China 
Model really took off in China in 2009; which brings us to the importance of the 
global crisis in accelerating interest in identifying what the model actually is, and its 
implications for the global order.
16
 
 
The Model and the Crisis 
                                                 
13
  See Scott Kennedy, ‘The Myth of the Beijing Consensus’, Journal of Contemporary China, 19: 65, 
2010, pp.461-477 
14
 Qian Gang, ‘How Should We Read China’s “Discourse of Greatness”’, China Media Project, 2010. 
Available at http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/02/23/4565/ accessed 5 January 2011. 
15
 A collection of 106 papers discussing and defining this model held by the China Elections and 
Governance project have been particularly useful in developing this paper. I have grouped these 
together for ease of access via http://tinyurl.com/chinamodel.  
16
 Though we should note that this was the 60
th
 anniversary of the PRC and Pan Wei’s book on the six 
decades of CCP rule was called “The China Model” which may also have had an impact on the spread 
of the term as people commented on this book. See Pan Wei, ed, (2009) 中国模式：解读人民共和国的60年 
zhongguo moshi: jiedu renmin gongheguo 60nian - The China Model: Understanding 60 Years of the 
People's Republic of China (Beijing: Central Translation Press, 2009). 
Somewhat ironically, just as more people seemed to be identifying a Chinese 
alternative for others to follow – sometimes with glee, sometimes in fear – from mid 
2004, the nature of this model came under increasingly critical scrutiny within China 
itself. The party’s verdict on its own ruling capacity (zhizheng nengli 执政能力) at the 
fourth Plenum of the 16
th
 Central Committee painted a picture of strained relationship 
between the party and the people and of an unsustainable growth model that urgently 
needed to be replaced by a “scientific” economic paradigm focussing on development 
rather than just growth.
17
 This apparent contradiction between perceptions of a system 
that seemed to have (at best) reached the limits of its usefulness on one side and of the 
identification of a new developmental model on the other was brought into sharper 
focus by the global economic crisis. 
 
Ding Xueliang argues that the crisis illuminate the model’s “chronic illness”, 
including its dependence on exports and the extent to which the government (and in 
particularly, local governments) were prepared to sacrifice long term rational 
development and the environment for short term social stability.
18
 For Yao Yang, the 
crisis marked the “end of the Beijing consensus”,19 and seems to have reinforced a 
growing belief that China needed to undertake a paradigm shift to a new mode of 
                                                 
17
 Central Committee, 中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定 zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang 
dangde zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding (The Party Central Committee Decision on Strengthening 
Governing Capacity Construction). Available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Sep/668376.htm accessed 13 November 2004. 
18
 Ding Xueliang, ‘警惕中国模式的“慢性病”’ jingti zhongguo moshi de ‘manxingbing’”, Nanfang 
Zhoumou, 9 December, 2010, p.31. 
19
 Yao Yang, ‘The End of the Beijing Consensus? Can China's Model of Authoritarian Growth 
Survive?’, Foreign Affairs Online, 2 February 2010. Available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus accessed 5 March 2010. 
growth based more in domestic household consumption and less on investment and 
exports.
20
 
 
These remain very real concerns. Nevertheless, the resounding consequence of not 
just China’s performance during and after the crisis, but also the comparative fate of 
those states that had been championing the Western liberal mode, was to accelerate 
interest in thinking about the China model. And for very good reasons. China had not 
only survived the 2008 crisis relatively intact – albeit through massive government 
spending and an even more massive extension of bank loans – but had also similarly 
fared well in the Asian crisis of 1997. As The Economist put it in its preamble to an 
online debate asking whether the China represented a better development model than 
the West (a motion that was defeated 42-58): 
The global financial crisis exposed critical weaknesses in western economies. 
China, by contrast, suffered only a brief slowdown in its fast-paced growth 
before surging back into double-digit expansion
21
 
So not surprisingly, policy elites in other countries sought to find the causes of this 
success, and how they might emulate it. In specific terms, attention focussed on the 
relative lack of financial liberalisation in China and the importance of developing 
large foreign currency reserves to act as a bulwark against global shocks. More 
generally, China’s economic performance re-legitimised state developmentalism,22 
and re-empowered those proponents of strong state models (who had been subdued 
                                                 
20
 Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the Crisis: Global Power, Domestic Caution and Local Initiative’, 
Contemporary Politics, 17: 2, 2011, pp.185–200. 
21
 The Economist, ‘China Model’. Available at http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/179. 
Accessed 13 August 2011. 
22
  Eva Paus, Penelope Prime and Jon Western, ‘China Rising: A Global Transformation?’ in Eva Paus, 
Penelope Prime and Jon Western, eds, Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), p.17. See also Robert Wade, ‘After the Crisis: Industrial Policy and the 
Developmental State in Low-Income Countries’, Global Policy, 1: 2, 2010, pp.150-161. 
after the Asian crisis) in their battles against proponents of (neo)liberal approaches 
across Asia.
23
  
 
The crisis also helped accelerate shifting patterns of economic interactions and the 
changing balance of economic power. There was an increase in Chinese relations with 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, with Chinese demand playing a key role in helping 
countries like Brazil recover from the decline in demand in North America and 
Europe.
24
 China also emerged as a key player in any attempt to create new 
mechanisms of global governance – be that in partnership with the existing global 
powers through the G20 and reform of the IMF, or in new “blocs” like the BRICS.  
 
The hope that domestic demand in China might lead the world out of recession was 
matched in some quarters by a concern with what this shift might mean for the 
balance of global power. This was not eased when the Governor of the People’s Bank 
of China called for an end of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency,25  an when 
online article suggesting that China should use its foreign currency reserves to cause 
economic problems in the US was widely reported and circulated outside China as a 
reason for fearing China’s growing financial clout.26  There seemed to be a general 
                                                 
23
 Richard Stubbs, ‘The East Asian developmental state and the Great Recession: Evolving Contesting 
Coalitions’, Contemporary Politics, 17: 2, 2011, pp.151-166. 
24
 John Whalley and Dana Medianu, ‘The Deepening China Brazil Economic 
Relationship’, CESIFO Working Paper, No. 3289, 2010. Available at 
http://www.ifo.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-
2010/wp-cesifo-2010-12/cesifo1_wp3289.pdf accessed 12 May 2011. 
25
 Zhou Xiaochuan, ‘Reform the International Monetary System’, 23 March 2009. Available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf  Accessed 21 February 2010. 
26
 This piece was posted on the Qiushi discussion page and was erroneously credited with being 
published in the Qiushi Journal which is the official theoretical journal of the CCP, and was thus 
mistakenly taken to represent official policy. Xu Yunhong, 中国应对美国对华遏制倾向政策的战略 
zhongguo yingdui meiguo duihua ezhi qingxiang zhengce de zhanlue China's strategy in Response to 
the US Containment Policy towards China’, Qiushi Lilun Wang (Qiushi Theory Network), 10 
December 2010. Available at http://www.qstheory.cn/lg/zl/201012/t20101210_59023.htm accessed 4 
January 2011. 
feeling in the end of 2009 that China was returning to its rightful place of centrality in 
the global order, and that its developmental model had been vindicated. In this 
respect, Pan Wei argues that what happened in 2009 was “more like a movement of 
cultural renaissance than a debate on the China model itself” – the content of the 
model was secondary to the importance of China’s success.27  
 
What is the China Model? 
As will be discussed later, this paper shares Pan Wei’s understanding that the idea of a 
China Model is more important as a symbol or a metaphor than as a distinct and 
coherent model that might provide a clear guide to development elsehwere. And as 
the above mentioned Economist debate put it in a rather understated manner, “there is 
disagreement over what the key ingredients of this model might be”; too true.28 But 
we can at least try to pull out what some of the main recurring themes are in the 
various writings and thinking on the China Model – perhaps to find different varieties 
of thinking rather than a single consensus.  
 
Part of the problem in identifying the components of any model is the huge diversity 
of developmental trajectories within China itself. To talk of a single Chinese model 
misses the huge variety – the different models – of economic structures within China 
itself.
29
 The political economy of Zhejiang where small scale private industry 
dominates is somewhat different from the more mercantile political economies of 
                                                 
27
 Pan Wei, ‘Western System Versus Chinese System’, University of Nottingham Contemporary China 
Centre Briefing Series No. 61, July 2010, p.9. 
Western System Versus Chinese System 
28
 The Economist, ‘China Model’. 
29
 Wang Shaoguang argues that this is one of the key strengths of policy reform in China; not just in the 
current era, but under Mao as well. But the key difference now when compared to previous eras is the 
much more open and plural political system that allows a variety of different voices and is unrestrained 
by being “politically correct” – there is no longer any need to prove revolutionary credentials. Wang 
Shaoguang, ‘Adapting by Learning: The Evolution of China's Rural Health Care Financing’, Modern 
China, 35: 4, 2009, pp.370-404.  
Chongqing and Shanxi, which are different again from social norms in Henan that 
have some links with China’s Marxist/Maoist past.30 Notably, even areas that on the 
face of it are very similar have adopted remarkably different development/growth 
strategies.
31
 
 
But rather than see this as a problem in identifying a model, it actually reinforces what 
is perhaps the single most important common strand. This is what Yao Yang called  
pragmatism (务实主义 wushi zhuyi) pursued by a “neutral” or “distinterested” 
government (中性政府 zhongxing zhengfu) that is simply concerned with doing what 
works in the long term and is not driven by any plan, blueprint, ideological 
commitment or societal bias.
32
 For most observers, it is this experimentation and non 
ideological (perhaps even de-ideologised) commitment to doing whatever it takes to 
promote growth whilst maintaining political stability that is the defining hallmark of 
the Chinese mode of governance. Perhaps best defined by Heilmann: 
 The key to understanding the adaptability of China’s political economy over 
the last few decades lies in the unusual combination of extensive policy 
experimentation with long-term policy prioritization
33
 
The regime has “localised” experiences of others, and selectively chosen what seems 
to work best for them.
34
 
                                                 
30
  I am grateful to Wang Zhengyi for these comments and ideas through discussions in Beijing in 2009 
and 2010. 
31
 John Donaldson, ‘Why do Similar Areas Adopt Different Developmental Strategies? A study of two 
puzzling Chinese provinces’, Journal of Contemporary China,18: 60, 2009, pp.421-444. 
32
 Yao Yang, ‘是否存在一个中国模式? shifou cunzai yige zhongguo mosih - Is there A China Model’, 
Tianyi Network, 8 March 2008. First accessed 3 June 2008. Now  from a source that is no longer 
available. Now available at http://www.bjzmw.cn/viewnews-3038.html, last accessed 13 June 2011. 
The translation of 中性政府 as “disinterested” is Yao Yang’s own preferred translation in email 
communication with the author.  
33
  Sebastian Heilmann, ‘Maximum Tinkering under Uncertainty: Unorthodox Lessons from China’, 
Modern China, 35: 4, 2009, p.450. See also Sebastian Heilmann, ‘Policy Experimentation in China’s 
Economic Rise’, Studies of Comparative and International Development, 43: 1, 2008, pp.1-26. 
 This state led experimentation (or devolved state led experimentation) has led to the 
Chinese experience being characterised by “gradualism” (渐进性 jianjinxing) 
alongside “autonomy” 自主性 (zizhuxing) and strong government (强政府 
qiangzhengfu).
35
 Crucially here, thinking about what China has done and what China 
might stand for is defined in opposition to what others have done (that China has not). 
So gradualism as Sun Liping argues, is something that in itself isn’t particularly 
remarkable; you can do many things in many areas gradually (good and bad). But this 
gradualism stands in stark contrast to the “shock therapy” that was the main modus 
operandi in the transition from socialism elsewhere, and the reform strategy of choice 
of the global neoliberal institutions (and so was not autonomous either for those that it 
was imposed upon). Gradualism in China had also occurred under conditions of 
“regime stability which stands in stark contrast to the collapse of some regimes and 
even the disappearance of some states in other parts of the once communist world.
 36
  
 
And although China has become integrated into the global economy, it is often seen 
as having done so on its own terms. This might seem a little strange given the fairly 
widely repeated criticisms in China that national interests have been overridden by 
powerful interests in the capitalist global economy (particularly but not only around 
                                                                                                                                            
34
 Xin Li, Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Michael Jacobsen, ‘Redefining Beijing Consensus: Ten General 
Principles’, Copenhagen Discussion Paper No. 29, 2009. 
35
 Along with the “correct” visionary policies of Deng Xiaoping. See Ma Depu, ‘渐进性、自主性与强政府 
- 分析中国改革模式的政治视角 Incrementalism, Autonomy and Strong Government - A Political Analysis 
of China's Reform Model', Dangshi Bocai, No. 5, 2005, pp.19-23. This is one of the earliest attempts I 
have found in Chinese to try and define what the Chinese Model might be.  
36
  Sun Liping, ‘Societal Transition: New Issues in the Field of the Sociology of Development’, 
Modern China, 34: 1, 2008, pp.106-7. 
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001).37 Nevertheless, there is a relatively strong line 
of thought in the China Model literature that points to the way that China has utilised 
foreign trade and investment where beneficial and given significant support to its 
exporters, but resisted competition in the domestic market where it might damage 
domestic economic actors. It is a process that Cao terms a ‘managed’ process of re-
engagement with the global economy or a state-led engagement of globalisation with 
a “nationalist tinge” where radical economic change has often been justified as being 
in “the national interest”. 38 
 
Strong government and stability often go together to form the political basis of a 
number of characterisations of the China Model. Once more bearing in mind the 
comparison between what China is, and the experiences of others (and what China is 
not), identifications of the China model seem often to go no further than simply 
describing high levels of growth and partial economic liberalisation achieved without 
fundamental democratisation and political liberalisation. As Zhao puts it, “the China 
model .... is often in a shorthand way described as a combination of economic 
freedom and political oppression.”39 Within the Chinese literature, the focus on 
stability is striking. Indeed, stability “takes precedence” because the Chinese people’s 
fear of chaos has become something akin to a “collective psychology”. 40 Indeed, it is 
                                                 
37
 Including calls to pay less attention to Adam Smith and consider the national political economy of 
List more seriously. See Han Deqiang (2000) 碰撞：全球化陷阱与中国现实选择 Pengzhuang: Quanqiuhua 
Xianjing yu ZhongguoXianshí Xuanze (Collision: The Globalisation Trap and China’s Real Choice) 
(Beijing: Economic Management Press). 
38
  Tian Yu Cao (2005) ‘Conclusion: The Theory and Practice of the Chinese Model’, in Tan Yu Cao, 
ed, The Chinese Model of Modern Development (London: Routledge, 2005), p.303. 
39
 Suisheng Zhao, ‘The China Model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, 19: 65, 2010, p.422. 
40
 Zhang Weiwei (2011) ‘一个奇迹的剖析：中国模式及其意义 yige giji de pouxi: zhongguo moshi ji qi yiyi 
Analysis of a Miracle: The China Model and Its Significance’, Qiushi, No.6, 2011. Available at  
http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2011/201106/201103/t20110325_74156.htm. For an English translation 
see  David Bandurski, ‘Zhang vsYang on the China Model’, China Media Project, 2011. Available at 
the basic starting point of everything - there will be no development at all, let alone a 
“model” without stability – which creates a “gradualist” virtuous circle of policy 
making. Stability is the first priority of government. This then allows for development 
which requires the reform of the existing system. Such reform becomes 
institutionalised by requiring laws, institutions, rules and so on, which in turn 
enhances political stability which then allows for further development and so on. And 
this is all predicated on strong government and a strong state making the right 
decisions and choices.
 41
 
 
This process of gradualism, experimentation, managed globalisation and a strong state 
has allowed for a sequencing of reforms that has served China well;
42
 a first wave 
built on the liberalisation of production that spurred an explosion of small-scale 
enterprises which then played a key role in the second wave of growth built on 
exports. It has also resulted in a mix of market and state that is the final main 
recurring theme in the various writings on the model – particularly (but not only) in 
external observations and assessments in the financial press. For example, in 
searching to find some form of basis for debating what the Chinese model might 
actually be, The Economist debate suggested the following main features: 
a managed exchange rate, state control over key industries including the 
banking system, preference for diktat rather than democratic debate, heavy 
state investment in infrastructure and strong support for the export sector
43
 
Similarly, in an overview of what the process of liberalisation in China had resulted in 
for The Financial Times, Kroeber and Yao concluded that “economic power remains 
                                                                                                                                            
http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/03/29/11205/ accessed 12 June 2011. Bandurski’s translation uses “collective 
fear” rather than “collective psychology” for 集体心理. 
41
 Discussions with Jia Qingguo, Beijing University, February 2009. 
42
 Zhang Weiwei, ‘Analysis of a Miracle’. 
43
 The Economist, ‘China Model’. 
firmly concentrated in the hands of the state”.44 The idea of strong statist control of 
the economy has also been reinforced by the way in which China’s elites responded to 
the global crisis, mobilising economic resources to surpass the target of 8 per cent 
growth in ways that eluded governments in other parts of the world.  
 
Of course, China has not simply remained an unreformed state planned economy; far 
from it. Indeed, in its version of the Chinese model, the World Food Programme 
points to policy makers creating a space for the market as the key reason behind 
China’s success in combating hunger – albeit a gradual introduction “to smooth the 
transition”.45 Huang Yasheng argues that there have been two China models – the 
statist one has only emerged quite recently and it was the first one built on 
liberalisation and the emergence of private sector activity (particularly in Township 
and Village Enterprises) that laid the foundations for China’s successes.46 And for a 
group of scholars in China who focus on the negative, rather than positive, 
consequences of reform, privatisation, the transition to the market, insertion into the 
global capitalist economy and the lack of state control are seen as the main source of 
China’s problems, rather than the root of any sort of miracle.47 
 
Huang’s consideration of the changing nature of this model over time partly helps us 
reconcile the apparent contradiction between strong statists and liberalisation 
approaches. But so too does thinking again about what China’s reform has not done 
and what China is not (rather than thinking about what it is). Compared to what went 
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before, the Chinese economy is much more liberal and market oriented today. But 
compared to some other developing states, former communist party states, and the 
perceived diktats of the Washington Consensus, then the key is the incomplete 
liberalisation (particularly financial and currency reforms), the use of banks to support 
priority industries, and the way that state sector continues to dominate the 
commanding heights of the national economy while still allowing a role for “hybrid 
local and foreign firms” and small-scale capitalist activity.48 
 
How Chinese is the Chinese Model? 
While the Chinese experience is clearly unique, drawing from a specific and 
particular set of circumstances, is it uniquely unique? The concept of a strong state 
controlling economic activity through the strategic use of finances pursuing 
asymmetric integration with the global economy to generate export led growth sounds 
somewhat familiar – not least to students of development in other parts of Asia. To be 
sure, there are many differences. The level of direct state control is probably stronger 
in China today than it was in South Korea for example, where the chaebols created an 
extra level or layer of authority between state and market. Conversely the power of 
the central state may be somewhat less in China than in previous cases, with the local 
governments playing a stronger role as agents of state developmentalism. History 
matters, and China’s history is obviously its own and by definition unique. The global 
context is also important and much has changed from the Cold War era that was such 
an important factor in building relations with the US for Taiwan and South Korea. 
And of course the sheer size and scale of China marks it out as being different from 
anything we have seen before.  
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 Nevertheless, echoes of what had happened in other parts of Asia in previous decades 
led Peerenboom to call his chapter on the Chinese developmental model, ‘Déjà vu all 
over again’.49 Scott Kennedy makes the point more forcefully than most, largely 
because of his dismissal of Ramo’s assertion that innovation has been a key pillar of 
China’s developmental successes: 
the intellectual source for most of China’s economic reforms has been the 
experiences of other countries, and China’s experts and officials have closely 
examined and borrowed from elsewhere. Ramo would have been closer to the 
mark if he said China was following in the footsteps of other developmental 
states
50
 
 
The idea that the Chinese experience has at least something in common with previous 
developmental states in Asia is widely accepted within China as well.
51
 However, 
while there had been considerable debate in China over the extent to which China’s 
own experience formed part of a wider East Asian model, there is a growing 
consensus that there really is something that is both independent and different. In this 
respect, ‘Ramo’s Beijing Consensus played a key role in establishing the uniqueness 
of the Chinese development model’,52 and we might suggest that the crisis and its 
consequences have reinforced this trend. 
 
                                                 
49
  Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
50
 Kennedy, ‘The Myth of the Beijing Consensus’, p.471. 
51
 Wang Yong, ‘Chinese developmental Road and Sino-African Relationship in the Context of the 
Global Financial Crisis’, in The Global Financial Crisis: International Impacts and Responses (Beijing 
University: Beijing Forum Organizing Committee). 
52
  Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, ‘China's Soft Power’, Asia Survey, 48: 3, p.464. 
In some respects, debating whether there is or isn’t a China model is irrelevant – as 
will be discussed later, if people think there is a China Model and then act 
accordingly, then this makes the model really exist. But debating the genealogy of 
models is more important than just an exercise in semantics. If the China model is 
thought of as being something new and different, then it might suggest that it 
represents a distinctive deviation from the “norm”; it is abnormal. But if China is 
simply another example of strong state developmentalism, then what is normal and 
what is the deviation? 
 
The Political Economy of Friedrich List 
It is here that we return to the debate over states and markets identified in the 
introduction, and the importance of List’s critique of free trade and Adam Smith. List 
is often referred to as a mercantilist, but in many respects, this is a miscasting of his 
position. List did not want to return to the mercantilism that Adam Smith had attacked 
in “The Wealth of Nations”. In the preface to “The National System of Political 
Economy” (1841), he responded to accusations that he was trying to revive 
mercantilism by arguing that he was trying to establish a new approach that kept the 
good parts of mercantilism but jettisoned its failings. Indeed, though much of his 
work specifically focuses on what he sees to be the problems with Smith, he was in 
many ways an admirer. Smith, after all, had been the first person to undertake a 
comprehensive study of this kind and was the originator of the science of political 
economy. Rather than simply reject Smith, he wanted to build on his ideas and take 
them further and in particular “politicise” what he thought was a purely economistic 
approach that was not informed by the concrete political realities of the actual world. 
Mathematic theories require simplicity to work and in the case of Smith require a 
cosmopolitical perspective where individuals act within a single global economic 
entity.  
 
For List this was all well and good in theory, but the reality of the actual world was 
rather different. In the real world, economies are “national” and government’s must 
decide what is best for the nation in competition with other rival national political 
economies – and what is best for the nation might not be what is best for individuals. 
Thus, for example, if the nation as a whole benefitted from the development of a canal 
system to build a national infrastructure, then this should be promoted (and funded) 
by the state even though the interests of some would be harmed by this development. 
Quite simply the interests of the individual were less important than those of the 
nation, and the government had to intervene to guide and lead based on long term 
national interests - not to intervene daily economic life, but through strategic 
intervention.  
 
For List, Smith had paid too much attention to exchange in his cosmopolitical world, 
and not enough to production. But in thinking about production, he went further than 
the mercantilist emphasis on “natural capital” (land, sea, rivers, mineral resources and 
so on) and included “material capital” (machines, tools and so on used in the 
production process) and “mental capital” which included skills, training, and 
enterprise as well as the more traditional tools of state power (armies, naval power, 
and so on).
53
 A key role for governments was to consider what would create wealth in 
the future – how to support and promote scientific discoveries, advances in 
technology, improvements in  transport, the provision of educational facilities and so 
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on. It also entailed governments provided the environment within which these 
advancements could occur – most clearly through the maintenance of law and order. 
All other things being equal, the more time and money that any government devotes 
to mental capital, then the more successful the nation will be in the long run. 
 
But it is not just in developing national strength that economics was political. For List, 
the promotion of free trade was political in itself. For List, “the English were the 
greatest bullies and good-for-nothing characters in Europe”.54  Their supremacy as an 
industrial power put Britain in a position to exploit its comparative advantage through 
the promotion of free trade with those areas that simply could not compete. But where 
Britain did not have a comparative advantage it through away its laissez-faire 
ideology and instead resorted to high tariffs to defend domestic producers. As a result, 
German states had been unable to move forward and compete with the dominant 
powers.  
 
As a result, there was little to no evidence of the benefits of free trade as a means of 
promoting development – rather it during times when there was a lack of free trade 
that German producers had prospered– most notably during the Napoleonic 
Continental System where a European blockade imports from Britain (including the 
colonies) created a space for domestic industries to grow. Though the end of the 
continental system in 1812-13 brought back a flood of cheap British goods into 
Europe, List was convinced about the benefits of a large internal unified market 
protected from more powerful competitors (and also convinced about the importance 
of a strong army and in particular a strong navy to support economic interests through 
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military force). Thus, the evidence pointed to the importance of protecting infant 
industries and the state led promotion of industrial innovation, transport and 
infrastructure, education and so on. The state also should provide stability and 
legality, and also invest in those harder military sources of power such (essentially 
armies). But this was not a rejection of trade per se. Rather, it was the promotion of 
delinking until the nation was able to compete on an equal footing with existing 
powers – or even better, to compete from a position of strength.  
 
In addition to being a theorist, List was also politically active as a proponent of a 
unified German state. List was imprisoned and then exiled for his political views 
(under the guise of corruption) in 1825, and it was in the USA that he found new 
evidence to support his emerging ideas. List was particularly impressed by the 
“American System” first established by Alexander Hamilton, and at the time 
supported and promoted by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay. This “system” 
entailed the creation of a national bank and sovereign credit to enable the government 
to guide development; the active promotion of agriculture, industry and science to 
integrate or “harmonize” them into a single economic structure; continental 
integration through government funded infrastructure developments; and high public 
land prices and external tariffs (notably the “Abominable Tariff” of 1828) to raise 
income for government projects and also to protect domestic producers from 
competition form more developed states. Moreover, the proponents of the American 
System shared List’s view that the promotion of free trade was simply a tool of 
national power – real free trade “never has existed, it never will”.55 For Clay, the 
whole basis of taxation in the USA from 4 July 1789 apart from paying the debts 
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incurred in wars was, in the words of the second ever statute of the USA for “the 
encouragement and protection of manufactures” (emphasis added to original by 
Clay).
56
 
 
So we might suggest, then, that the USA was the first “Capitalist Developmental 
State”. And just as the nascent American System played a key role in aiding 
development in the USA, so the Bismarkian project that subsequently built on List’s 
ideas propelled Germany to centrality in Europe. This success influenced the ideas of 
Toshimichi Okubo, who placed “learning from Germany” at the heart of the 
renaissance of the post-Meiji Japanese economy (beyond his own truncated political 
career).
57
 While somewhat modified by the experiences of the second world war and 
indeed the aftermath of the war, these ideas were again to play some part in 
influencing Japanese development from the 1960s, and subsequently the capitalist 
developmental states in East Asia in the 1970s and 80s.
58
 Here, of course, state led 
development and protectionism was much aided by the geostrategic context of the 
Cold War which meant that the USA not only tolerated protectionism and state led 
development in Taiwan and South Korea, but largely funded it; partly through aid and 
military protection, and partly through allowing unprecedented access to the US 
market without seeking reciprocal market access and liberalisation.
59
  
 
Strange Bedfellows? The Left and List 
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The point of this discussion of earlier developmental states is not to praise them as 
perfect alternatives to the liberal model. The search for alternatives to neoliberalism 
can also result in some strange alliances – a form of ideational realpolitik where 
anything that is oppositional to neoliberalism is “my enemy’s enemy” and therefore 
my friend. But List was above everything else a nationalist and not an internationalist. 
A nationalist who was committed to doing what he thought was best for what was to 
become modern Germany. He was committed to the creation of a strong army and a 
strong state to defend the national interests in a hostile international environment. 
Moreover the national project was the end, and the mobilisation of the people a means 
to that end. For Marx, List was “a true German philistine” 60 who (at best) 
misunderstood Ricardo and the nature of labour, thinking of workers as units of 
production to be deployed and mobilised to provide surplus for the (German) 
bourgeoisie.
61
 
 
And it is not just in List himself that seekers for alternatives find their beliefs 
challenged. Where the ideas have been put into practice, this has typically been by 
authoritarian and even anti-democratic governments that organise workers behind a 
national project – often if not typically trampling over workers’ rights in the process. 
The alternative to neoliberal capitalism, then, appears to entail the use and abuse of 
the workers as a means of national generation both in (Listian) theory and in practice. 
In at least two cases (Germany and Japan), these developmental states have 
destabilised regional security and ultimately contributed to war. Or as Ben Selwyn 
puts it, there is often:  
                                                 
60
  Karl Marx (1845) Unpublished Article on Friedrich List’s book: Das Nationale System der 
Politischen Oekonomie, 1845. Available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/03/list.htm accessed 1 June 2009. 
61
  Karl Marx, Critique of Political Economy: Part I: The Commodity, 1859, footnote 8.  
a disjuncture between the political regimes that neo-Listians aspire to 
(democratic and liberal) and those they assert are required for high-speed 
catch-up development (authoritarian)
62
  
As we shall see, this search for alternatives to neoliberalism has resonance in some of 
the discussions of the Chinese alternative as well. 
 
So the point, here, is not to laud the Listian developmental state as a solution to all the 
ills of the liberal project. Rather, it is to point to the continuities between the Chinese 
model, previous Asian models of state developmentalism, and European and 
American “systems” of state guided development before that. In this context, it is 
ahistorical to use the idea of the China model as representing a deviation from the 
norm; rather it is an example of what has been a rather “successful” mode of 
industrialisation in a number of places for a number of years (in terms of GDP growth 
achieved at least). In this respect, rather than think in terms of a China model, it is 
perhaps more correct to talk of 有中国特色的新李斯特式发展型国家 – a neolistian 
developmental state with Chinese characteristics.  
 
The Model is in the Eye of the Beholder 
But if people think that the Chinese model exists, and then develop policies based on 
their understanding of the Chinese model, then it really does exist. And there is 
evidence to suggest that there are many who really do think that China offers 
something to learn from. But two caveats and one question are very important here. 
The first caveat is to consider in whose eyes the Chinese model exists. At the risk of 
oversimplification, it would seem to be more appealing to developmental elites who 
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want to emulate China’s experience of rapid economic growth (while not losing 
power) than it would be to democracy promoters, civil societies, opposition parties or 
even workers in Chinese run mines and factories or those who cannot compete with 
cheaper Chinese imports.  
 
The second caveat is to acknowledge that people tend to take what they want out of an 
experience in building either a positive or negative view of it. For those who see, for 
example, the Chinese economic model as a good thing to be copied, the emphasis is 
on the successes – for example, economic growth, poverty reduction, job creation, a 
strong state, managed globalisation on China’s terms. And understandably so. But for 
each of these successes it is possible to see negatives as well – the impact on the 
environment, the quality of jobs and conditions for workers, growing inequality, poor 
access to health education and welfare, corruption, dependence on the global 
economy and so on. Of course, this is not just confined to China; one could say 
similar things about the “American dream”. But both the most laudatory and the most 
negative assessments of the China model do tend to be rather partial in their nature.  
 
For Yang Jisheng, the main blame for this partial reading of the Chinese experience 
lies with Western observers
63
 who, in their search for alternatives to the neoliberal 
orthodoxy, individually and collectively reinforce a “conservative” consensus on 
China. They do this by first, only focusing on the positive sides of the China story, 
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second, by ignoring the role that the market and liberalization (including political 
reform short of democratization) had played in generating successes and third by 
seeing authoritarianism as being an essential component in generating these 
successes. Talking about the China model in this way, then, both within China and 
without is a means by which the status quo is reinforced and arguments proposing the 
need for political reforms designed to deal with fundamental problems are 
undermined.
64
  
 
Is the Model Transferable? 
After these two caveats, the question arises as to whether the model is actually 
transferable or not. If the model is in the eye of the beholder, then people will simply 
construct a version of it that fits with their objectives – so in this sense the model (or 
versions and varieties of the model) can indeed be transferred to different settings. But 
viewed another way, there are two key reasons why the model doesn’t look 
particularly transferable. First, China’s circumstances have been so special – not least 
the simple scale and size of China – that it is difficult to see how others could do what 
China has done.
65
 For this reason, Zhang Xiaomin prefers to translate 模式 as a 
“mode” of governance as it is not a “model” that can be replicated.66 
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Second, in many respects the defining characteristic of the China Model is that it 
should not be considered to provide a specific guide to action or a blueprint for others. 
One of the major criticisms of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus is the 
attempt to impose a “one size fits all” solution on countries with different structures, 
systems and needs. Shen and Bai argue that although developed nations are all 
“market economies” there is no single model of what a market economy is or should 
be. They emerged in different ways because of the different conditions and resources 
of each nation; for example, the evolution of German and Japanese capitalism and 
market economies being very different from the American experience. Diversity is 
right and natural and it is the attempt to impose uniformity and “indiscriminately copy 
another country’s model” that is the problem. Thus, the Latin American economic 
crisis had its roots in the emulation of the “Washington Consensus” model of free-
market capitalism, rather than seeking development trajectories that suited the 
concrete circumstances of each Latin American state.
67
   
 
So what China has done is not to follow any other model but to do what is best for 
itself based on its own conditions. As Pan Wei puts it: 
 [The] China model consists of four sub-systems, they are: a unique way of 
 social organization, a unique way of developing its economy, a unique way 
 of government, and a unique outlook on the world. (emphasis added)
68
 
So the China model isn’t important for others because of the specifics of what has 
happened in China. Rather, it is important for establishing what can be done if other 
countries do what is best for themselves based on their own concrete circumstances 
                                                 
67
  Shen Li and Bai Qunying, ‘解读中国经济模式 jiedu zhongguo jingji moshi Analysis of China’s 
Economic Model’, Guangming Ribao, 15 May 2006.  
68
 Pan Wei, ‘The Chinese Model of Development’, Foreign Policy Centre, 11 October 2007. Available 
at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/888.pdf accessed 3 January 2008. 
and don’t simply do what they are told to do by others. The key message from the 
China model is “start from national conditions, and take your own road” 
从国情出发，走自己的路.69  
 
Thus, the Chinese experience is best thought of as an example of what can be done if 
you follow your own path (even though not all share China’s power to act with such 
relative autonomy) rather than a model. China is also an alternative – not just an 
alternative development model, but an alternative economic partner that is happy to 
deal with other countries with no strings attached. Or more correctly, with few strings 
attached (not recognising Taiwan is a pretty important string) and certainly with no 
democratising agenda linked to economic relations. This creates an important space 
for the countries it deals with to develop their own indigenous strategies with more 
autonomy than would be the case if they had no option but to deal with the major 
western powers. Proactive Chinese policy helps in the promotion of the idea of China 
as alternative here – through “hard” initiatives like the cancelling of debt, and through 
“softer” initiatives such as the idea that China treats other developing states as 
partners (and by implication, that others don’t). 
 
So what makes dealing with China attractive is not so much a Chinese ‘model’ but the 
lack of projection of any model. And although it might sound counterintuitive, not 
being identified as the promoter of any specific normative position is in itself a 
normative position. Rather than thinking about what China is, and what China stands 
for, instead we need to think about what China is not and what China does not stand 
for: it is NOT big bang reform and shock therapy, it is NOT a process where 
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economic liberalisaiton necessarily leads to democratization, it is NOT jettisoning 
state control over key sectors, it is NOT full (neo)liberalization (particularly in 
financial sectors), it is NOT the western way of doing things, it is NOT following a 
model or a prescription, it is NOT being told what to do by others and it is NOT 
telling others what to do. And it has done what it has done despite external pressure to 
do otherwise, and it has managed to survive two crises and it has NOT collapsed as 
foreigners kept predicting that it would.  
  
Towards Occidentalism and Exceptionalism 
Establishing what something is not requires something for it to be “othered” against. 
We noted above the role of the crisis in changing thinking on the China model – in the 
words of the creator of the idea of the Washington Consensus himself: 
 A major impact of the crisis has been to discredit Western views of 
development—what I once tried to summarize under the somewhat unhappy 
term of the “Washington consensus”—and to fortify what has sometimes 
been referred to ....  as the “Beijing consensus” instead70 
So at the moment at least, China doesn’t have to do much to make itself and/or its 
model look attractive – it can just sit back and let the Western model (or models) 
become increasingly unattractive and repellent. War in Iraq and the the selective 
imposition of western norms through intervention combined with the crisis of 
neoliberal capitalism (after a rather arrogant and triumphalist western response to the 
Asian crisis) is enough to send many looking for an alternative, and finding it in 
China.  
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But the Chinese authorities are not simply sitting back, and are actively promoting a 
preferred idea of what China is and what it stands for in international relations. This 
entails a form of Occidentalism where images and understandings of “The West” are 
constructed against which non-western cultures/societies/states identify themselves.
71
 
This does not have to be an explicit statement of what the other actually is, but is 
implied by stating what China represents. For example, saying that China stands for 
peace and harmony is unremarkable unless others don’t stand for this – and that the 
West doesn’t stand for peace and harmony is implicit in the promotion of a preferred 
national identity in China.  
 
Thus, we see the promotion of a China that is not seeking to impose its world view on 
others, and a power that thinks that each country is free to do what it wants within its 
own sovereign territory. Its preferred world order is one that allows for plurality built 
on China’s historical cultural predilection for harmony, virtue and society and by 
solving problems peacefully. China is dissatisfied with the existing distribution of 
power in global institutions and seeks greater representation for the developing world, 
but it is also a responsible great power and will not destabilise the world order as it 
seeks to “democratise” it. The implicit other here is an interventionist, hegemonic, 
materialistic West. The Western world order is built on a narrow European history 
that it seeks to be not only the core of global governance, but also to impose on other 
states. It is even prepared to use coercion and ultimately military force to do so and to 
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solve problems in its favour, and to ensure that its unfair and asymmetric power in the 
global system is maintained and strengthened. And in order to do so, China is 
depicted as a threat – a destabilising force in the global system whose rise should be 
feared.  
 
Building on this understanding, the idea of China as an inevitable threat to the global 
order and the USA in particular is seen as emerging from a way of theorising 
international relations that is based only on the experiences of the West. From this 
point of view, international relations theory is not actually international at all, but 
merely Western. There is thus a need to develop theories that instead reflect China’s 
own experiences rather than simply “taking” existing theories and approaches – to 
create a “Chinese School”72 that will help explain why China’s rise will be peaceful 
and not a repeat of the turbulent rise of Western powers like Germany.
73
 This is 
reflected in the ongoing attempts to create Chinese theories of IR, IPE, regional 
integration and so on. Underpinning this project is the basic idea that China is 
different – a different sort of state with different values based on different cultural and 
philosophical traditions that will shape its different behaviour as a great power. And 
to establish this difference, a project is underway to use an eclectic mix of 
Confucianism and Daoism and the writings of Sunzi and Mencius to create and 
construct a version of Chinese history that creates a basis for this difference.
74
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In his discussion of Zhang Weiwei’s work on the China Model, Bandurski sees 
something that looks akin to the creation of the idea of American exceptionalism.
75
 
Starting from de Tocqueville’s analysis of the exceptional nature of American 
democracy,
76
 the idea of the US as being fundamentally different from other countries 
rested on its newness – its ability to build a country based on democracy and freedom 
because it wasn’t constrained by historical class and societal tensions that held back 
democracy in other (older) countries. It was also a shining beacon to other countries – 
and for some, this meant that the US had a moral duty to spread its correct democratic 
values across the world resulting in a foreign policy that Krauthammer called 
“Democratic Realism”.77  
 
Chinese exceptionalism also sees China as fundamentally different from the rest of 
the world. Zhang Weiwei’s promotion of the idea of China as the world’s only 
“civilization-type nation” 文明型国家 takes us down a road that ends in a situation 
where: 
 no rules apply to China that are not China’s own …. only what is 
quintessentially Chinese can accommodate China’s unique “national 
circumstances”78 
Under this understanding, the China Model simply must be a unique phenomenon. It 
is by its very nature abnormal and deviant – not just different from the neoliberal 
Washington consensus but also fundamentally different from (and separate to) any 
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other type of developmental state that preceded it. It is an entirely separate genus of 
state and economy from anything else that has ever existed.  
 
Of course we can question the veracity of a version of history that sees China as a 
force for peace, harmony and stability. Cohen focuses on China’s international 
relations and concludes that ‘historically, a strong China has brutalized the weak’.79 
Dirlik similarly questions the pacific nature of domestic society, including delving 
into the still very sensitive area of periods where harmony and peace was distinctly 
lacking in the post-1949 era.
80
 For Scobell, Chinese policy makers have convinced 
themselves that they are guided by a historically inspired “cult of defense” that does 
not stand up to historical scrutiny and runs counter to the actual basis of military 
activity bother overseas and in domestic politics in the PRC era.
81
 But China is far 
from the only place in the world where preferred versions of history come to be 
accepted as the truth, or where this truth becomes the basis of a common 
understanding of the present and the national identity. And how other states identify 
their values and the importance of spreading them to the rest of the world has had a 
considerable impact on the lives (and deaths) of many millions around the world. 
 
Nevertheless, this discourse of Chinese exceptionalism and difference has far more 
than semantic importance. It not only feeds into understandings of China’s place in 
the world, but also has important domestic uses and consequences. It explains why 
China does not have to follow anything – including any path that sees democratisation 
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as an inevitable consequence of economic liberalisation. And in this respect, Yang 
Jisheng sees the promotion of a unique China Model as part of a wider project of 
Occidentalism – though he uses the term anti-westernism – designed to defend 
inequality and the political status quo in China.
82
 Identifying whether there is a model 
or not, then, is not just a matter of academic interest, but something that might have 
real significance for the way that millions of Chinese live their lives in the future. 
 
Conclusions 
The starting point for this paper was the argument that state led approaches to 
development have been much more influential than the dominant orthodoxy – before 
the global crisis at least – would seem to suggest. Indeed, when viewed through a 
historical lens, what has happened recently in China has parallels with previous 
experiences of strong state development in Europe, the USA and East Asia. At best, 
then, the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus (as they came to be understood 
during the moment of unipolarity) seem to be ahistorical. For Chang, they represent 
an attempt to stop others emulating the experience of the first (and later) generations 
of developmental states, that did not themselves accede to the principles of free trade 
that they now espouse (and indeed, in many cases still do not accede to).
83
  
 
From this perspective, what has happened in China does not seem particularly 
remarkable at all. Although we can argue over the specifics, the Chinese experience 
broadly conforms with a state led growth project that places the national project at the 
centre of policy, and which points to the importance of promoting and protecting key 
economic sectors and actors, and using a central financial institution and a form of (at 
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least) soft planning as the means of national construction and economic development. 
From such a historical viewpoint, focussing in on the Chinese example is important, 
but not enough in itself as it gives only a partial view of developmental processes that 
have been at the heart of (initial) industrialisation strategies since at least the 1820s 
(and arguably even earlier).  
 
But the focus on China is entirely understandable – it is the most recent and in terms 
of GDP growth the most successfully sustained example of such state led 
development. As a result, perhaps the most significant role that China plays as the 
world rethinks modes of governance is reminding us once again of the “success” of 
alternatives to the neoliberal project. And what has happened during and after the 
crisis has reinforced the image of China representing strong state developmentalism 
that provides perhaps the best bet for other developing states in a post(?) global crisis 
world. That China is prepared to engage other states in a way that is rather different 
from Western states only serves to enhance the idea of China as “alternative” – a 
project that is ably supported by the concerted efforts of the Chinese state to promote 
itself as “different”. That it also has the money to invest in other states, and a market 
that is hunger for resources from a wide range of different countries only adds to 
China’s significance and attraction as a partner. 
 
Attempts to construct an image of China as a different type of state and different type 
of actor in international economic relations stem in part from feelings of vulnerability. 
China’s leaders are aware that their grip on power cannot be taken for granted and 
realise that China’s position in the global (political) economy is a key determinant of 
domestic economic growth. In keeping with the idea that diplomacy should serve 
domestic economic construction,84 this initially saw an attempt to allay fears about the 
consequences of China’s rise to Great Power status, and an emphasis on China as 
peaceful, harmonious and responsible. But a desire for peace and responsibility does 
not simply equate with a commitment to and/or acceptance of the status quo. As a 
‘dissatisfied responsible great power’,85 China’s elites have presented in image of the 
country as being a force for responsible but fair change to the global distribution of 
power which should result in a greater voice and role for developing states. Moreover 
China has tried to establish its own normative position as a non-interventionist state 
that is simply unconcerned about how other sovereign nation states manage their own 
domestic political and economic affairs. This idea of China’s difference is part of a 
feedback loop that has seen the idea of the Chinese model both result from, and then 
reinforce, conceptions of Chinese difference and exceptionalism; the model is both a 
result of China’s unique history and at the same time a manifestation of China’s 
uniqueness and ‘difference’. 
 
So in many respects, we can think of the China Model as a speech act – talking about 
it makes it exist and something that has to be dealt with. But it does not yet have 
intersubjective meaning – there is not a common and agreed understanding of what 
the China Model means and whether it infers uniqueness or not. And whether they 
like it or not, those who talk and write about the China Model or the Beijing 
Consensus need to be aware that they are part of the process of making it real. This 
includes not just those who laud and admire the Chinese alternative, but also those 
                                                 
84
  Zhao Suisheng, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2004), p.259. 
85
 Shaun Breslin, ‘China’s Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power’, Politics, 30: 
s1, 2010, pp. 52-62. 
who are more critical and/or are concerned about a China challenge to the existing 
global order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
